A very good morning to all of you and let me say that I am delighted to join you all at the Nikkei Forum, to discuss the India-Japan partnership in the context of the evolving global order. As you are all aware, or atleast as some of you would be aware, I have written two books that certainly discuss the changing order, while also flagging the relevance of India-Japan ties. That of course underlines my deep conviction on this subject. It also reflects the long association I have had with this relationship, and the witness I bear to its transformation in the last two decades.
2. In my first book ‘The India Way’, I spoke of the future posture of Japan as a big imponderable because it will bring back into the global security calculus a major economy with enormous technological capabilities. In the four years that have passed since that first book was published, I am even more convinced of this belief. We are transitioning into a world of AI and chips, of electric mobility and batteries, of clean and green tech, of space and drones, and indeed, much else that awaits us. There is the mirror image of this assessment that pertains to India, with its enormous pool of talent. On my current visit, realizing this complementarity has actually been one of the focal points of my discussions.
3. Another point which I make in my first book is actually of the historical basis for our relationship, some of which is perhaps a little unfamiliar to the current generation. What is important is that for us, history is a positive force in our relationship, something perhaps that cannot always be said in Asia. Keeping that in mind, I focused on the maritime aspects of that collaboration. A reason for doing so was that in 2019-20, that’s when my first book came out, the debate about the Indo-Pacific was still hot, just as the jury was out on the Quad. Since then, both have settled down finding wider acceptance even beyond the region. The maritime issue was particularly important because it was the truest example of the global commons challenge that was emerging at that time. Again, since then, it is even more so because of a lot of changes that we expect to see in terms of new maritime balances.
4. A related issue that I flagged was that of connectivity. India was the first country to display strategic clarity in regard to contemporary initiatives. We publicly urged that connectivity endeavours must be collaborative, be transparent, be viable and respectful of sovereignty. Frankly speaking, most of the world wobbled in this regard at that moment. Time and experience has brought them around, but not without a cost.
5. In my second book ‘Why Bharat Matters’, I have approached the Japan relationship more explicitly from the perspective of the Quad. One question that has intrigued many observers is, why the Quad failed in 2007 but succeeded in 2017 and thereafter. The answer of course is that in 2007, none of the parties was willing to invest the necessary capital, the political capital, to make that happen. And they would not because with the possible exception of a few voices in Japan, none of them actually had a good reading of how developments in the Indo-Pacific would unfold over the next decade. In 2017, we were clearly much wiser as a result of intervening events. But even this is not a full answer in itself.
6. The fact is that of the Quad members, two of them have treaty relationships with the third. India is many ways, is an outlier. But my case is that between 2008 and 2017, India’s bilateral relationship with the United States, with Japan and with Australia has changed so drastically that a Quad arrangement has became both viable and sustainable. I have compared these three bilateral relationships in my book, and you can see that while there is a parallel time frame for improvements between India’s ties with US and Japan, the Australian one has really played a remarkable catch up in the last decade.
7. Having said that I would strongly caution that there is no room for complacency in diplomacy. Relationships need to be continuously tended at various levels. They also need to be constantly refreshed. They will always be new complexities but equally, fresh opportunities. This is how India and Japan should approach each other today.
8. Overall, and I say this after a long discussion yesterday with my counterpart, Minister Kamikawa, we are convergent on the big picture and the key concerns. Our inclination and ability to respond in a more coordinated manner has also improved. We can for example, see that in defence where a bilateral military exercise is going on between India and Japan, even as we speak. It is much better in investment, though trade remains flatter than we would wish. India and Japan are also having an active conversation on emerging technologies that holds much promise. Creating new supply chains and building a stronger digital connect are priorities for both of us. We work well together in world politics, including of late in the multilateral organisations. People-to-people linkages however lag behind and clearly need more attention. This is the report card right now.
9. My argument is that India-Japan ties will both draw strength from our larger activities together, especially from Quad; but as well contribute to its effectiveness and to its breadth. The bottom line is that the world is changing, the Indo-Pacific is changing, India and Japan are changing, but that in our relationship, many solutions for us nationally, as well as for the region and for the world, lie there.
So, once again I thank you all for joining me today and I look forward to the conversation.